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                       OPINION OF THE COURT 
                    _________________________ 
 BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 
         This is an appeal from an order of the district court in 
a diversity case granting summary judgment for the defendants on 
plaintiff's state law claims of breach of contract and tortious 
interference with a prospective economic relationship.  We affirm 
with respect to the tortious interference claim, but reverse with 
respect to the contract claims, and remand for further proceedings. 
 
                                I. 
         Defendant The Mortgage Corner ("TMC") runs a multilender 
mortgage loan network.  Lenders on TMC's network regularly fax 
their current mortgage rates, terms, and conditions to TMC 
financial service representatives ("FSRs") stationed in various 
local real estate offices.  The FSRs then present these rates and 
terms to potential homebuyers.  In this manner, lenders compete for 
business, and consumers have a choice of mortgage rates and terms.  
For its part, TMC receives a percentage of each loan that closes as 
a result of its referral.   
         On July 23, 1992, Sterling National Mortgage Company 
("Sterling") entered into an agreement with TMC pursuant to which 
it became a lender on the TMC network.  Under this agreement, TMC 
"may submit completed Mortgage Loan Applications to [Sterling] from 
time to time."  (J.A. at 18.)  Sterling, in turn, had a duty to 
"process, accept, issue mortgage loan commitments for, fund and 
close, in a timely manner," the applications submitted by TMC.  
(J.A. at 18.)  For each completed loan, Sterling would pay TMC .625 
basis points.  (Pl.'s Br. at 7.)  The agreement was to last one 
year but could "be terminated without cause by either party upon 
thirty (30) days written notice to the other."  (J.A. at 20.)  
Sterling geared up for the network competition.  It hired two 
people to service both the TMC system and a similar network.  By 
February 1993, Sterling was performing well and had received 109 
mortgage applications.   
         All was not, however, copacetic.  Centerbank Mortgage 
Company ("CMC") owned TMC.  CMC was also a lender on the network, 
and it was TMC's hope that CMC would secure a significant number of 
loan referrals from the FSRs.  (Dep. of Former TMC President, 
Walter Vail at J.A. 108.)  To this end, TMC management stressed its 
goal to the FSRs.  (See Dep. of TMC Regional Manager, Nicholas 
Meras at J.A. 104.)  FSRs were also paid higher commissions for 
CMC referrals.  Eventually, according to Sterling, FSRs were 
specifically discouraged from referring loans to Sterling, (J.A. 
45-46), and ultimately, on April 27, 1993, TMC's Regional Manager 
Nicholas Meras issued a memorandum instructing the FSRs to stop 
accepting Sterling applications, (J.A. 42).  It was not until May 
14, 1993, (two and one half weeks after this effective termination) 
that TMC sent Sterling the thirty day notice of termination 
required under the agreement.  That notice, which was properly 
executed, became effective June 14, 1993. 
         On July 26, 1993, Sterling filed a three count complaint 
against TMC and CMC (referred to collectively as "defendants") in 
the district court.  The defendants filed an Answer and 
Counterclaim alleging that Sterling had failed to pay all of TMC's 
fees.  Following discovery, Sterling and the defendants filed cross 
motions for summary judgment on Sterling's affirmative claims.    
         In Count I of its complaint, Sterling alleged that TMC 
had breached the network contract by (1) encouraging its employees 
to dissuade customers from choosing Sterling's loan products, and 
(2) by terminating the contract before providing thirty days 
notice.  (Dist. Ct. Op. at J.A. 174.)  In its summary judgment 
motion, TMC contended that, since the contract provision at issue 
simply provided that TMC "may" submit loans to Sterling, TMC was 
under no obligation to refer any loans to Sterling, and therefore 
could not be held in breach of the agreement.  The district court 
agreed, and granted TMC's motion for summary judgment on Count I.  
It reasoned that, because TMC's referral of loans to Sterling was 
completely discretionary, Sterling was unable, as a matter of law, 
to establish that the agreement was breached.  (Dist. Ct. Op. at 
J.A. 175.) 
         In Count III, Sterling charged that TMC's behavior 
breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing under 
Connecticut law.  The court concluded that, while every contract 
carries this implied covenant "which requires that neither party do 
anything that will injure the right of the other party to receive 
the benefits of the agreement," such principle "cannot be applied 
to achieve a result contrary to the clearly expressed terms of the 
contract."  (Dist. Ct. Op. at J.A. 176.)  According to the court, 
"under the clearly expressed terms of the agreement . . . The 
Mortgage Corner had total discretion as to whether to refer loan 
applications to Sterling."  (Dist. Ct. Op. at J.A. 176.)  The court 
granted TMC's motion for summary judgment on Count III as well.  
         Sterling's Count II alleged that the defendants' steering 
of consumers to CMC tortiously interfered with Sterling's 
prospective economic relationship with both TMC and potential 
customers.  The district court noted that the defendants had 
directed loan applications to CMC and had paid higher commissions 
on loans placed there.  (Dist. Ct. Op. at J.A. 177 (citation 
omitted).)  However, such conduct, the court reasoned, could not 
form the basis of a tortious interference claim in this case.  
Because TMC had no obligation to originate any loans with Sterling, 
neither defendant by its actions could have "lured away" any of 
Sterling's customers.  Therefore, no genuine issue of material fact 
existed as to the "gravamen of a tortious interference claim is 
'the luring away, by devious, improper and unrighteous means, of 
the customer of another' . . . ." (Dist. Ct. Op. at J.A. 177-78 
(citation omitted)).  As an alternative basis for its holding, the 
district court stated that the dispute was not covered by tort 
principles because a party could not tortiously interfere with its 
own contract.  (Dist. Ct. Op. at J.A. 178.) 
         Sterling appeals the district court's determinations.  
Our review of the district court's grant of summary judgment is 
plenary, See Groman v. Township of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d 
Cir. 1985). 
                               II. 
                                A. 
         We first take up the district court's grant of summary 
judgment for the defendants on Sterling's Count I claim that TMC's 
attempt to discourage FSRs from offering Sterling's loans and TMC's 
premature termination of Sterling's relationship constituted a 
breach of contract.  As noted above, the district court viewed the 
relevant contract clause, "[TMC] may submit completed Mortgage Loan 
Applications [to Sterling]," (J.A. at 18), as unambiguously 
granting TMC complete discretion in the referral process, (Dist. 
Ct. Op. at J.A. 175).  As such, the court concluded that any 
actions by TMC that might have inhibited referral could not violate 
the contract.  (Dist. Ct. Op. at J.A. 175.) 
           The use of the word "may" in Sterling's contract could, 
of course, signal a discretionary duty on the part of TMC.  
However, Sterling argues, and we agree, that the clause setting 
forth TMC's responsibilities is ambiguous.  According to Sterling's 
submission, it expected and was entitled to participate in a fair 
competition to attract borrowers.  Along with other lenders, 
Sterling would fax its mortgage rates to TMC.  TMC, through its 
FSRs, would then display those rates to consumers.  If a consumer 
chose Sterling's proposed mortgage arrangement, TMC was supposed to 
submit to Sterling the completed mortgage application.  In other 
words, TMC was obligated to submit bids to Sterling, but only in 
the event that a consumer opted to apply for a loan from Sterling.  
Under this persuasive interpretation, TMC's attempts to avoid 
directing referrals to Sterling could constitute a breach of 
contract, and the word "may" refers merely to the contingent 
(rather than the discretionary) nature of the referrals.   
           As with any ambiguous term, the district court should 
have admitted extrinsic evidence to ascertain its meaning.  See, 
e.g., Hare v. McClellan, 662 A.2d 1242, 1249 (Conn. 1995); Levine 
v. Massey, 654 A.2d 737, 744 (Conn. 1995) (Berdon, J., dissenting).  
The court thus incorrectly granted summary judgment to the 
defendants based on a plain reading of the contract; rather it 
should have permitted extrinsic evidence to establish the actual 
rights and responsibilities of the parties. 
                                B. 
          The district court should also not have granted summary 
judgment for the defendants on Sterling's Count III claim of a 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  That 
covenant prohibits each party to a contract from engaging in 
behavior that would thwart the other's rational expectations.  In 
the majority of states, "even though the express terms of a 
contract appear to permit unreasonable action, the duty of good 
faith limits the parties' ability to act unreasonably in 
contravention of the other party's reasonable expectations."  3A 
Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 654A(B) at 89 (Supp. 1994).  
Although Connecticut recognizes that the good faith covenant 
protects the parties' expectations, it takes a more restrictive 
position than the majority.  In Connecticut, the covenant cannot be 
applied to achieve a result contrary to the clearly expressed termsof a 
contract unless those terms are contrary to public policy.  
Eis v. Meyer, 566 A.2d 422, 426 (Conn. 1989).  Sterling argues that 
the defendants' behavior violated its reasonable expectation that 
it was to participate in a fair competition. 
         In Warner v. Konover, 553 A.2d 1138 (Conn. 1989), the 
Connecticut Supreme Court applied the covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing to a landlord-tenant agreement.  The lease arrangement 
in Warner prohibited the tenant from assigning his interest without 
the written consent of the landlords.  Id. at 1139.  When the 
landlords conditioned tenant's assignment on a renegotiation of the 
rental payment, the tenant brought suit.  Id. at 1140.  The 
landlords argued that, absent a clause in the lease specifying that 
consent could not be unreasonably withheld, they retained 
unfettered discretion to withhold consent.  Id. 
         The trial court agreed and dismissed the tenant's 
complaint, but the Supreme Court reversed.  Id.  The Supreme Court 
explained that "'[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of 
good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its 
enforcement.'"  Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 
205).  It then reasoned that a landlord "who contractually retains 
the discretion to withhold its consent to the assignment of a 
tenant's lease must exercise that discretion in a manner consistent 
with good faith and fair dealing."  Id. at 1140-41.  The court 
refused to say whether the landlords had in fact breached the 
covenant, as that determination would involve a complex evaluation 
of the defendants' "faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and 
consistency with the justified expectations of the [tenant] . . . 
."  Id.  Nonetheless, the plaintiff's claim alleged sufficient 
indicia of a breach to survive summary judgment. 
         Shortly after Warner, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
refused to apply the good faith covenant to a case involving an 
easement.  Eis v. Meyer, 566 A.2d 422 (Conn. 1989).  In Eis, the 
plaintiff's deed provided that upon expansion of his home, his 
easement over the defendant-neighbor's property would be 
extinguished.  Id. at 423.  The plaintiff informed the defendant of 
his plan to build an addition.  Id.  Knowing that this action would 
extinguish the easement, the defendant remained quiet  -- at least 
until the addition was built, at which point she promptly 
terminated the plaintiff's easement.  Id.  Plaintiff claimed that 
defendant's underhandedness was a violation of the implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, but the Supreme Court disagreed.  
Id. at 425. 
         Acknowledging that the covenant had been applied to the 
lease in Warner, the court distinguished that case.  In Warner, the 
landlord had retained discretion to withhold consent to assignment 
of the lease.  Id. at 426.  "The express terms of the lease, 
however, did not establish the parameters of that discretion.  
Accordingly, we held that implicit in the terms of the lease was 
that the landlord's discretion must be exercised in a manner 
consistent with good faith and fair dealing."  Id. (citations 
omitted).  By contrast, the clearly expressed terms of the deed in 
Eis "contemplated termination only upon an affirmative act of the 
dominant tenement owner [i.e. the plaintiff in this case]."  Id.  
To condition termination on the silence of the burdened landowner 
would contradict the express terms of deed.  Id. at 426.  Although 
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing is a rule of 
construction used to fulfill the reasonable expectations of the 
parties, it could not be applied to achieve a result contrary to 
the clearly expressed terms of a contract.  Id. 
         Using the aforementioned principles as our guide, we 
consider the district court's grant of the defendants' motion for 
summary judgment on the breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith.  Although the district court provided little explication of 
its reasoning, it seemed to conclude that, even if Sterling 
rationally expected to participate in a fair competition, the 
contract language that TMC "may" direct loans to Sterling granted 
TMC complete discretion in the referral process.  On this theory, 
any determination that TMC breached the implied covenant of good 
faith by failing to refer loans to Sterling would contradict the 
express terms of the contract making referral discretionary.  
(Dist. Ct. Op. at J.A. 176.)  
         We disagree.  Even if TMC did have total discretion to 
direct loans to Sterling, its behavior could still violate the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.  According to Sterling's 
submission, TMC billed the network as an even competition among 
lenders when, in fact, the network was rigged in CMC's favor.  Such 
a misrepresentation would be evidence of TMC's bad faith.  
Furthermore, as Warner makes clear, when a contract has afforded a 
party unbounded discretion, it is perfectly proper to impose a duty 
on that party to exercise its discretion in good faith.  In Warner, 
the landlords had unrestricted power to refuse assignments.  But 
implicit in this power was a requirement that they wield it fairly.  
Warner, 553 A.2d at 1140-41.  Accordingly, TMC's seeming discretion 
to refer loans should have been exercised in conformance with 
Sterling's reasonable expectations. 
         Moreover, unlike the clear specifications for easement 
termination in Eis, the contract condition that TMC "may refer" 
loans to Sterling is an ambiguous requirement subject to several 
interpretations.  "May" can indicate discretion, but as we have 
earlier noted, may can also indicate a conditional occurrence or 
event.  The simple fact that this clause is amenable to more than 
one interpretation indicates that subjecting the defendant's 
performance to a good faith requirement could not violate the 
contract's express terms. 
         In sum, Sterling's claim that TMC's actions in dissuading 
consumers from choosing its product and prematurely terminating its 
contract breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is 
sufficient to survive summary judgment. 
 
                                C. 
         In Count II, Sterling alleged that the defendants' 
practice of steering loans to CMC constituted tortious interference 
with its prospective economic relationship with both TMC and 
potential borrowers.  More specifically, Sterling complained about 
the higher commissions paid to FSRs for CMC referrals and the 
reminders that FSRs received about the increased profitability of 
placing loans with CMC.  (Pl.'s Br. at 21.)  According to Sterling, 
CMC's "special advantages" were never disclosed to it; rather, 
Sterling was led to believe that its loans competed on a level 
field with all other lenders. 
         This claim need not detain us long.  Whether or not 
Sterling has otherwise met the various requirements of the leading 
New Jersey case regarding tortious interference, see Printing Mart- 
Morristown v. Sharp Electronics Corp., 563 A.2d 31 (N.J. 1989), it 
has not advanced sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment. 
         There is evidence of relevant acts committed by TMC.  For 
example, Nicholas Meras, TMC's Regional Manager, reminded the FSRs 
about the lucrative nature of CMC loans, and ultimately issued a 
memorandum instructing the FSRs to stop accepting Sterling 
applications.  But, it is axiomatic that TMC cannot be said to have 
tortiously interfered with its own contract.  Therefore, the only 
possible viable claim as to tortious interference could be against 
CMC.  The most that Sterling adduces as to CMC, however, is the 
conclusory allegation that CMC gave incentives to the FSRs, such as 
higher commissions, to steer loans to CMC.  No other acts are cited 
to support a tortious interference claim.  This showing is 
insufficient to survive summary judgment. 
         CMC is the parent of TMC, and perhaps there is evidence 
somewhere that CMC dictated TMC's allegedly offending decisions.  
However, it was up to Sterling to come forward with such evidence 
to raise a triable issue and to defeat the motion.  Mere 
speculation about the possibility of the existence of such facts 
does not entitle Sterling to go to trial.  And, even if a parent 
may be liable for a subsidiary's decisions on how to manage its 
commercial relationships, that is not enough to establish tortious 
interference with prospective economic relations as contemplated by 
Printing-Mart.  The summary judgment with respect to the tortious 
interference claim will therefore be affirmed. 
 
                               III. 
          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court will be affirmed as to Count II and reversed as to Counts I 
and III and remanded for further proceedings with respect to those 
counts. 
                      _____________________ 
                                          
